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CRIMINAL LAW-NEW EVIDENCE IN GATEWAY

CLAIM OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE REQUIRES
EVIDENCE NOT PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE AT
TRIAL-KIDD V NORMAN, 651 F.3D 947 (8TH CIR.

2011)
The writ of habeas corpus is a mechanism that allows prisoners to
challenge the legality of their incarcerations.'
The actual-innocence
doctrine, which provides petitioners the ability to obtain review of
procedurally defaulted claims, permits limited access to the writ in
circumstances where a petitioner can produce new reliable evidence
demonstrating probable innocence. 2 In Kidd v. Norman,3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the meaning of "new"
evidence as it pertained to a petitioner's gateway claim of actual
innocence.4 The court held that the petitioner failed to present new reliable
evidence that would entitle him to review of his underlying constitutional
claim because the evidence he provided could have been discovered at
trial.5
In 1999, a Missouri state court sentenced Ricky L. Kidd to life in
prison after a jury found him guilty of participating in the killing of two

1 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (2006) (outlining federal habeas corpus substantive law and
procedures). "Habeas corpus" is a Latin phrase that literally means "you have the body."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009). The United States Supreme Court has observed,
"It is clear... from the common-law history of the writ, that the essence of habeas corpus is an
attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973); see also infra text accompanying notes 15-30 (outlining federal habeas corpus law
generally).
2 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (setting forth actual innocence standard as
"gateway" for obtaining review of defaulted claims). The standard provides that in order to
obtain review of a procedurally defaulted claim of constitutional error, a petitioner must
demonstrate that, in light of new reliable evidence that was not presented at trial, it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Id.
' 651 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2011).
4 See id. at 952 (noting circuits have disagreed upon meaning of "new" evidence in gateway
innocence claims).
5 See id. at 953 (concluding petitioner's evidence could have been discovered through the exercise
of due diligence). The court further noted that it was bound by Eighth Circuit precedent. See id.
(citing Eighth Circuit's prior rulings); United States v. Reynolds, 116 F.3d 328, 329 (8th Cir.
1997) (stating "one panel may not overrule another"); see also Anrine v.Bowersox, 238 F.3d
1023, 1029 (8th Cir. 2001) (positing evidence is new only if undiscoverable at trial through
exercise of due diligence).
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men.6
Kidd filed a direct appeal, which the court denied.7
Kidd
subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that his
direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Kidd should
not have been sentenced as a prior offender.8 The Missouri Court of
Appeals concluded that Kidd suffered no prejudice from his appellate
counsel's failure to challenge Kidd's prior offender status, and affirmed the
denial of his motion for post-conviction relief.9
Following the court's denial, Kidd filed a habeas petition in federal
district court raising five new claims alleging the ineffectiveness of his trial
counsel.'0 Kidd conceded that his claims had been procedurally defaulted
by failing to raise them in his state court post-conviction proceeding, but
claimed that he could overcome the default by introducing new evidence
demonstrating his innocence.
The federal district court held an
6 See State v. Kidd, 990 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining specific offenses of

which Kidd was convicted). At the conclusion of Kidd's trial, the jury found that on February 6,
1996, Kidd and a co-defendant, Marcus Merrill, shot and killed George Bryant and Oscar Bridges
in Bryant's home in Kansas City, Missouri. Id. at 177-78. The evidence against Kidd included
testimony from the victim's daughter, a four-year-old, and from the victim's neighbor, both of
whom identified Kidd as one of the perpetrators. Id. The jury convicted Kidd of two counts of
class A felony murder and two counts of armed criminal action. Id.; see also Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.020 (1994) (mandating that persons under sixteen convicted of murder receive life in prison
without parole); Mo. REv. STAr. § 571.015 (1994) (providing armed criminal action consists of
using deadly weapon to commit felony).
7 See Kidd, 990 S.W.2d at 180-86 (explaining court's reasoning for denying Kidd's appeal). In
his appeal, Kidd alleged that the trial court committed three distinct errors: (1) it admitted
hearsay statements not within any exception; (2) it abused its discretion by denying Kidd's
request for severance from his co-defendant; and (3) it allowed unduly prejudicial testimony
referring to Kidd as the "Terminator." Id. at 177. The appellate court rejected each of these
arguments in turn, ruling that if there were errors, they were not unfairly prejudicial. Id. at 181,
184, 186.
' State v. Kidd, 75 S.W.3d 804, 806 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (outlining basis of Kidd's appeal). Kidd
pointed out that the information did not charge that he was a prior offender and that he had no
notice of the State's intention to prove prior offender status. Id.
9 See id. (noting Kidd would have received life without parole independent of counsel's error).
Notably, Kidd did not challenge the effectiveness of his trial counsel in his post-conviction
action. See id. at 808-09 (explaining basis of Kidd's appeal).
10 See Kidd, 651 F.3d at 949 (enumerating Kidd's claims). Kidd's ineffective assistance of
counsel claims relied primarily on the assumption that his trial counsel failed to present evidence
that would have proved his innocence. Id. at 951. Specifically, Kidd alleged that his trial counsel
failed to present the evidence that would impeach the eyewitness, Richard Harris; neglected to
present evidence that would have placed Kidd in downtown Kansas City thirty minutes before the
shooting; and overlooked evidence that would have implicated other individuals in the murders.
Id. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (articulating standards
governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and that the
defendant was prejudiced by that deficient performance. See id. (stating strong presumption that
counsel's conduct is professionally reasonable).
1 See Kidd, 651 F.3d at 949 (noting Kidd's admission of procedural default). The procedural
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evidentiary hearing and denied Kidd's habeas petition, ruling that most of
his evidence was not new and that his only piece of new evidence was
unreliable. 2 Kidd appealed the decision, challenging the district court's
strict interpretation of new evidence." 3 The Eighth Circuit upheld the
district court's ruling, asserting that a petitioner seeking to resurrect
procedurally defaulted claims must present new evidence that was not
available at trial through the exercise of due diligence.' 4
The common law writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner or
detainee to come before a court for inquiries into the lawfulness of the
detainment.' 5 By requiring that there be sufficient legal cause to detain a
person, the writ safeguards the integrity of the criminal justice process, and
thus came to be regarded in the United States as the "symbol and guardian
of individual liberty.' 1 6 The Constitution protects the writ, providing that

default rule posits that a state prisoner may be barred from seeking federal review of his federal
constitutional claims denied by the state court for failure to comply with a state procedural
requirement, including the timing of a post-trial motion. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 731-32 (1991) (reaffirming procedural default rule). Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15
allows convicted felons held in detention in violation of the United States Constitution or the
constitution or laws of that state to pursue post-conviction relief. See Mo. SuP. CT. R. 29.15(a)
(providing relief for those claiming ineffective assistance of counsel). These post-conviction
proceedings compel a defendant to raise all claims known to the defendant. See id at 29.15(b)
("Failure to file a motion within the time provided by this Rule ...shall constitute a complete
waiver of any right to proceed ... and a complete waiver of any claim that could be raised in a
motion filed pursuant to this Rule 29.15."); see also Wiglesworth v. Wyrick, 531 S.W.2d 713,
715-16 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (compelling defendants to raise claims or lose them). Failure to
raise a claim constitutes waiver, and a defendant cannot raise such claims in a subsequent petition
for habeas corpus relief. See Smith v.State, 887 S.W.2d 601, 602-03 (Mo. 1994) (en banc). But
cf infra text accompanying note 25 (explaining federal courts' exceptions allowing review of
procedurally defaulted claims).
12 See Kidd, 651 F.3d at 950 (explaining district court's ruling). The district court found Kidd's
only new evidence testimony from Merrill-unreliable because it was likely offered to further
Merrill's own interests. Id.Because Kidd's other evidence was available to him at trial, it was
not new, and could not be considered by the court. Id.
13Id. Kidd argued that "new evidence in support of a Schlup claim of actual innocence should

include any evidence not presentedat the original trial." Id.(emphasis added).
14See id.
at 953 (concluding district court properly applied Eighth Circuit precedent).
15 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 58 (Eng.) (codifying law of habeas corpus in
England). The act states, "[W]hensoever any person.., shall bring any habeas corpus [claim]"
before a court, the court shall "certify the true causes of his detainer or imprisonment." Id.The
common law writ of habeas corpus accompanied the British settlers to America. See Limin
Zheng, Comment, Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the
Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 2101, 2109 (2002) (observing

early history of the writ).
16 See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968) (stating writ ensures petitioner may require his
jailor to justify the detention). The Court has commented that "[a]lthough in form the Great Writ
is simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of
fundamental rights of personal liberty. For its function has been to provide a prompt and
efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints." Fay v. Noia, 372
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"[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,

unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."' 7 The Constitution, however, neither authorizes the federal
courts to issue writs, nor defines the scope of federal habeas corpus
review. 8 Recognizing the importance of safeguarding individual liberties,
Congress enacted various pieces of legislation establishing the power of the
federal courts to issue such writs.' 9
Although such legislation
unambiguously provided federal courts the power to issue writs, it failed to
prompt the judiciary to expand the scope of habeas review beyond its
original parameters; for years, federal courts continued to limit the scope of
the writ as performing 2only
the narrow function of testing the jurisdiction
0
of the sentencing court.
U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963). Courts have invoked habeas corpus to protect individual liberties from
a variety of abuses. See, e.g., Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 333 (1941) (affording habeas
relief where defendant convicted without benefit of counsel); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429
(1885) (granting writ because defendant prosecuted without grand jury indictment); Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 176-78 (1873) (holding lower court lacked jurisdiction in sentencing
defendant twice for the same offense).
17U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. At the time of drafting the Constitution, there was considerable
historical basis demonstrating the need for the suspension clause: the English Parliament had
frequently suspended the writ during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, permitting
confinement without judicial process. See Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpusfor Convicts
ConstitutionalRight or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 335, 339 (1952) (noting further
suspensions in eighteenth century, including one prompted by American Revolution); see also
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1980) (providing indepth history of habeas corpus).
" See Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 80 (1807) (holding power to issue writ stems from
common law, not Constitution); Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal
Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1079, 1081 (1995) (stating habeas
corpus has never been considered constitutional right); Zheng, supra note 15, at 2109 (reiterating
common-law origins of habeas corpus).
19 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789) (making habeas corpus
available to federal prisoners). Commentators suggest that concerns about the government
suspending habeas corpus over federal prisoners, which prompted the suspension clause in the
Constitution, led to the enactment of section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Collings, supra
note 17, at 339 (citing delegate Charles Pinkney as example of politician concerned with
suspension of writ). Congress amended habeas corpus legislation less than a century later. See
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867) (expanding federal courts'
habeas jurisdiction to state prisoners). The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 permitted federal courts
to grant writs "in all cases where any person may be restrained ... in violation of the constitution,
or of any treaty or law of the United States." § 1, 14 Stat. at 385. It was of "well known origin"
that the purpose of expanding the purview of habeas was to protect freedmen and loyal unionists
in the Confederate states. See Forsythe, supra note 18, at 1116-17 (suggesting Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867 was promulgated to enforce Reconstructionist measures); see also Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 646, § 1, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 964-67 (1948) (codifying federal habeas
corpus statutes and judicial habeas practice in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255).
20 See, e.g., Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879) ("[A] conviction and sentence by a court
of competent jurisdiction is lawful cause of imprisonment .... "); In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 176, 191 (1847) (declining to grant habeas review, "[h]owever erroneous the judgment", if
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In the mid-twentieth century, as concerns over individual liberties
gave traction to the concept of due process, the Court began to broaden the
scope of habeas review.21 Through several important decisions, the Court
abandoned the limitation of habeas review to jurisdictional challenges.22
This decision to broaden the scope of habeas review produced unintended
consequences, however, as petitioners once limited in their ability to bring
habeas claims began filing claims en masse, flooding the federal
judiciary.23 Specifically, repetitious and successive claims not only
overwhelmed the federal courts, but also created a threat to the finality of

jurisdiction was proper); Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (stating judgment of
court of competent jurisdiction sufficient to refuse writ); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
317 (1995) (acknowledging Court's early application of writ as testing solely for jurisdiction);
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991) (noting Court's limited use of writ originally);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-82 (1976) (affirming habeas originally available only to
remedy jurisdictional defects in legal process). The test of jurisdiction was rooted in the trust and
respect higher courts held for the decisions of lower courts of competent jurisdiction. WILLIAM
F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 257 (1980). See generally Dallin
H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451, 459-68
(1966) (observing that until early twentieth century, habeas courts confined to considering
jurisdiction of sentencing court).
21 See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 478-79 (noting scope of review expanded to encompass claims of
constitutional error); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (observing broadening
application of writ); Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293, 307-09 (1963) (granting federal courts
broad authority to review constitutional issues arising in state criminal convictions), overruledby
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). See generally Max Rosenn, The Great Writ A
Reflection of Societal Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 343-44 (1983) (portraying Warren Court era
as "zenith" of writ's expansion). Rosenn explains that during this era, federal habeas corpus
acquired enormous flexibility and power. See id.at 353 (attributing power of writ to Court's
expanded interpretation of due process rights); see also infra note 22 and accompanying text
(discussing broadening scope of writ through abandonment of jurisdiction limitation); cf
Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New FederalismAfter the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 337, 387 (1997)
(noting Warren Court used writ "as its enforcement arm for the provisions of the Bill of Rights").
22 See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (expressly abandoning jurisdiction
limitation on scope of habeas corpus claims). The Court held that "the use of the writ in the
federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those
cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court." Id; see
also, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) ("Conventional notions of finality of
litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is
alleged."); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-65 (1953) (holding all constitutional claims were
grounds for federal habeas corpus relief); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915)
(recognizing habeas corpus relief would be available to prisoners convicted after inadequate court
proceedings).
23 See Brown, 344 U.S. at 536 (Jackson, J., concurring) (expressing concern over "flood of stale,
frivolous and repetitious petitions" on courts' dockets); S. REP. NO. 89-1797, at 1 (1966),
reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3663, 3663-64 (citing steady increase in habeas petitions starting
in 1941 through fiscal year 1966); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 143-44 (1970) (discussing increase in habeas
corpus petitions filed by state prisoners over five-year period).
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state court judgments and to the principles of comity and federalism.24
Recognizing the need to curb such abuse, both Congress and the federal

courts set forth a variety of procedural barriers
in an effort to once again
25

limit access to federal habeas corpus review.
Procedural barriers restored the number of habeas claims to a

manageable level by barring the majority of frivolous habeas claims;26
however, they did so to the exclusion of legitimate habeas claims as well.

24 See

McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 492 (noting adverse effect of repetitious filings on administration

of justice in federal courts); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986) (observing federal
habeas review detracts from states' ability to review and adjudicate state claims), superseded by
statute on other grounds, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (stating "Great Writ imposes
special costs on our federal system"). The Engle Court posited that federal intrusion into state
criminal trials frustrates both the state's sovereign power to punish offenders and its good-faith
attempts to honor constitutional rights. Engle, 456 U.S. at 128.
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006) (authorizing federal district courts to dismiss second or
successive petitions in most circumstances); S. REP. NO. 89-1797, at 2 (1966), reprintedin 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3663, 3664 (amending section 2244 to introduce "a greater degree of finality of
judgments in habeas corpus proceedings"). Responding to Congress's attempt to ensure the
finality of judgments, the Court identified several rules restricting petitioners' access to habeas
review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 (1995) (discussing case law limiting petitioners'
access to the writ). Under the procedural default rule, the Court barred habeas claims raising
issues that were not properly raised in state court. See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 490 (discussing
purpose of procedural default rule to achieve procedural regularity); Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 730 (1991) (barring habeas relief where prisoner failed to meet state procedural
requirement); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (excluding petitioner's claim for
failure to make timely objection in state court); see also 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

at 1403, 1535 (6th ed. 2011) (providing

detailed analysis of procedural default rule). The Court also identified two categories of abusive
petitions that warrant dismissal: petitions that raise identical grounds to those raised and
dismissed on the merits in a prior habeas corpus petitions (successive petitions), and petitions that
raise grounds that were previously available but not relied upon in previous habeas petitions
(second petitions). See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (identifying
categories of petitions warranting dismissal). Until 1986, petitioners who had run afoul of either
the second petition rule or the procedural default rule could only obtain review if they could show
cause for failing to raise their claims in earlier proceedings, and prejudice resulting therefrom.
See Carrier,477 U.S. at 485 (applying cause-and-prejudice exception to procedurally defaulted
claims); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (invoking cause-and-prejudice exception to
procedurally defaulted claim); McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 490-91 (stating admission of second
petition subject to cause-and-prejudice exception). Cause requires the petitioner to demonstrate
an external factor that impeded counsel's efforts to raise a claim, while prejudice requires a
petitioner to show that trial error worked to his actual, as opposed to possible, disadvantage. See
Carrier,477 U.S. at 488 (defining "cause"); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)
(discussing prejudice).
26 See, e.g., Engle, 456 U.S. at 133-34 (denying relief because counsel's failure to raise
claim did
not constitute cause for procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (denying
habeas relief despite evidence at trial showing unconstitutional search and seizure); Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (denying habeas relief because petitioner could not
demonstrate prejudice); cf Zheng, supra note 15, at 2122-23 ("The cause-and-prejudice standard
creates a nominal exception to the procedural barriers.... The Court's stringent application of the
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Aware that such barriers would unduly prejudice some wrongly convicted
prisoners, the Court, in a trio of 1986 decisions, once again broadened the
scope of permissible habeas claims by creating an "actual innocence"
exception that would allow petitioners who could demonstrate probable
innocence to obtain review of otherwise procedurally-barred claims.27
However, in issuing these decisions, the Court failed to clearly articulate
the evidentiary burden placed on petitioners making gateway claims of
actual innocence, which resulted in diverging approaches. 28 In 1995, the
Court clarified its evidentiary standard for actual innocence claims,
positing that in order to obtain review of procedurally defaulted claims, a
petitioner must present "new reliable evidence" in light of which it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.29 Once
again, the Court was unsuccessful in establishing clear precedent because it

cause-and-prejudice exception is consistent with its view that the rule is premised on concerns for
comity and finality rather than on concerns for the petitioner's constitutional rights.").
27See Carrier,477 U.S. at 495 ("'
[I]n appropriate cases' the principles of comity and finality that
inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must yield to the imperative of correcting a
fundamentally unjust incarceration."' (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 135)). The Carrier Court
stated that "where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of
cause for the procedural default" to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Id.at 496. The Court noted
that the question of whether an incarceration is "fundamentally unjust" almost always centers on
the innocence or guilt of the prisoner. Id. at 495-96; see also Smithy. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537
(1986) (approving review if constitutional violation likely resulted in conviction of one who is
actually innocent); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting
"ends of justice" require federal courts to hear successive petitions if factual innocence shown).
Five years later, the Court affirmed its actual innocence exception. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (approving actual innocence exception to circumvent bar against second
petition). See generally Friendly, supra note 23, at 150 (advocating innocence standard as
principle for courts to "screen out ...applications not deserving their attention').
28 Compare Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 350 (1992) (requiring habeas petitioner show
innocence by clear and convincing evidence), with Carrier477 U.S. at 496 (requiring showing
that constitutional error probably resulted in wrongful conviction), and Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at
454 (requiring petitioner to make "colorable claim of factual innocence"). The petitioner in
Sawyer claimed he was not deserving of the punishment, as opposed to claiming innocence of the
crime; a fact that likely contributed to the Court's more stringent evidentiary requirement. See
Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336 (outlining petitioner's claim of innocence). The Eighth Circuit
subsequently applied the Sawyer standard in a case where the petitioner claimed innocence of the
crime. See Schlup v. Delo, 11 F.3d 738, 740 (1993) (adopting Sawyer standard), vacated, 513
U.S. 298, 332 (1995).
29 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 329 (1995) (holding Carrier probable innocence
standard applied when petitioner claimed innocence of the crime). In Schlup, the petitioner
claimed that the ineffectiveness of his counsel, and the withholding of evidence by the
prosecution, denied him the "full panoply of protections" afforded to criminal defendants by the
Constitution. Id. at 314. Accordingly, Schlup's claim of innocence was not "'itself a
constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have
his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits."' Id.at 315 (quoting Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)).
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did not precisely define what it meant by "new" evidence; consequently,
courts have split as to what "new" evidence should require. g
30 Compare Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2003) (positing evidence is new so

long as it was not presented at trial), and Griffinv. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2003)
(asserting evidence not presented at trial is new), and Garcia v. Portuondo, 334 F. Supp. 2d 446,
454 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding evidence may be new so long as original fact finder never
considered it), with Hubbard v. Pinchak, 378 F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 2004) (maintaining evidence
only new if it was not available at trial), andBannister v. Delo, 100 F.3d 610, 618 (8th Cir. 1996)
("[p]utting a different spin on evidence that was presented to the jury does not satisfy the
requirements set forth in Schlup." (quoting Bannister v. Delo, 904 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (W.D. Mo.
1995))). One of the reasons for the split in the circuit courts is because the Supreme Court, in
articulating the Schlup standard, has never had the opportunity to consider newly-presented
evidence. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 306-07 (considering newly-discovered testimonial evidence);
see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 557 (2006) (evaluating claim in light of previously
unavailable evidence including new DNA evidence). As evidence that the Court meant to include
newly-presented evidence in its definition of new evidence, jurists cite the Court's use of the
word "presented," as well as its favorable reference to Judge Henry J. Friendly's article stating
habeas courts should consider "all evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted
... and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongfully excluded or to have become available
only after the trial." Friendly, supra note 23, at 160; see Gomez, 350 F.3d at 679 (opining
absence of word "discovered" was not "mere oversight"). Other courts, including the Eighth
Circuit, have formulated bright-line tests without reference to the precise verbiage used by the
majority in Schiup. See Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 1023, 1028 (8th Cir. 2001) ("'[E]vidence
is new only if it was not available at trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the
exercise of due diligence."' (quoting Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1230 (8th Cir. 1997))).
In Amrine, the petitioner attempted to revive numerous procedurally defaulted claims alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, asserting specifically that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to: (1) investigate Amrine's social, family, and medical history; (2) request jury
instructions regarding the credibility of inmate snitches; (3) take appropriate steps to prevent him
from being tried by an all white jury; (4) object to the prosecutor's improper closing arguments,
and for allowing Amrine to walk past the venire panel in full restraints, as well as asserting
Amrine's privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury. Amrine, 238 F.3d at
1029 n.3. Amrine also raised non-procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, alleging that counsel failed to elicit exculpatory evidence. See id. at 1030 (enumerating
Amrine's non-procedurally defaulted claims). The court declined to consider claims which were
procedurally barred on the basis that petitioner failed to present new evidence, and rejected
petitioner's non-procedurally defaulted claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because
petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's perfornance. See id. at 1030-31 (concluding Amrine
failed to show prejudice resulting from attorney's deficient performance). See generally
Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing strong presumption that
counsel's conduct is within parameters of professional requirements). Amrine's bright-line rule
on new evidence subsequently became precedent, as Eighth Circuit courts invoked its holding to
all procedurally defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Osborne v. Purkett, 411
F.3 d 911, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying Amrine rule to claim of ineffective counsel for failure
to present exculpatory evidence); Nance v. Norris, 392 F.3d 284, 290-91 (8th Cir. 2004)
(applying Amrine where counsel allegedly failed to present evidence that would have proved
petitioner's innocence). One court noted that it generally approved of Amrine's narrower
definition of new evidence, except where the underlying claim was ineffective assistance of trial
counsel for failure to present exculpatory evidence. See Houck v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 94 (3d
Cir. 2010) (articulating unfairness of Amrine if applied too broadly). Commentators have also
joined the debate, and like the federal courts, have failed to reach consensus regarding what
constitutes "new" evidence. Compare Jay Nelson, Note, Facing up to Wrongful Convictions:
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In Kidd v. Norman, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the

petitioner met the actual innocence exception as a gateway to resurrecting
procedurally defaulted claims of constitutional error that occurred in the
underlying trial.3 ' The court noted that under Schiup v. Delo, a petitioner
making an actual innocence claim must submit new reliable evidence that

was not presented at trial.32

The court acknowledged that the circuits

disagreed as to what the Supreme Court meant by "new" evidence,

commenting that both interpretations were subject to criticism.3 3

In a

relatively brief opinion, the court relied on Eighth Circuit precedent in
holding that Kidd failed to present new evidence, reasoning that the
evidence was not new because although it was not presented at trial, it was
available at trial through the exercise of due diligence.34 The court implied

that its narrower interpretation of "new" might not be equitable where the
underlying constitutional claim is ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to raise exculpatory evidence, but nevertheless concluded that it was
Broadly Defining "New" Evidence at the Actual Innocence Gateway, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 72029 (2008) (arguing evidence should be considered new so long as not presented at trial), with
Jennifer Gwynne Case, Note, How Wide Should the Actual Innocence Gateway Be? An Attempt
to Clarify the Miscarriageof Justice Exceptionfor FederalHabeas Corpus Proceedings,50 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 669, 673 (2008) (arguing for narrower newly-discovered standard in gateway
claims of innocence). Regardless of which position one supports, it seems that as of 2006, the
result for petitioners is much the same; most fail to satisfy the Schlup standard and do not obtain
review of their underlying claims. See Brief for Former Prosecutors and Professors of Criminal
Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (No. 048990), 2005 WL 2367033, at *10 [hereinafter House Amicus Brief] (observing less than ten
percent of petitioners successfully raise Schlup gateway claims); David R. Dow et al., Is It
Constitutional to Execute Someone Who Is Innocent (And If It Isn't, How Can It Be Stopped
Following House v. Bell)?, 42 TULSA L. REv. 277, 289, 399-400 (2006) (showing as of October
9, 2006, every gateway petitioner since House failed Schlup standard).
31 See Kidd v. Norman, 651 F.3d 947, 947-48 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating issue in case). See
generally supra text accompanying note 29 (describing nature of gateway claim of actual
innocence).
32 See Kidd, 651 F.3d at 951-52 (discussing Schlup standard). Under the Schlup analysis, an
actual innocence claim requires a petitioner "to support his allegation of constitutional error with
new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness
accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
"3 See Kidd, 651 F.3d at 952 ("The more restrictive definition ... has been criticized when the
procedurally defaulted claim ... is an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim ... for not
discovering and presenting ... exculpatory evidence .... ); see also Gomez, 350 F.3d at 679-80
(criticizing restrictive approach where underlying claim is ineffective counsel for failure to
present exculpatory evidence). Conversely, the Third Circuit stated that the broader definition of
"new" evidence espoused by the Seventh Circuit is flawed because "it is not anchored to a claim
that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel by reason of counsel's failure to present
evidence of the petitioner's innocence." Houck, 625 F.3d at 94.
14 See Kidd, 651 F.3d at 953 (concluding district court correctly interpreted Amrine standard on
"new" evidence); Amrine, 238 F.3d at 1028 (stating evidence only new if not available at trial
through exercise of due diligence); see also supra text accompanying note 10 (listing "new"
evidence Kidd attempted to elicit at initial habeas proceeding).
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bound by Eighth Circuit precedent.35
The Kidd court's decision is in line with precedent that has too
broadly restricted habeas corpus claims.3 6 Although the Eight Circuit's
narrow interpretation of "new" evidence is correctly oriented toward
respecting state court judgments, its approach is misguided for a number of
reasons.3 7 As an initial matter, it is troubling that Amrine v. Bowersox,
which established Eighth Circuit precedent, failed to consider the
majority's specific language in Schiup that refers to newly "presented"
evidence.38 Rather, by adopting a newly-discovered rule, the Eighth

Circuit requires petitioners to obtain new evidence post-conviction, a
somewhat unrealistic expectation, while ignoring the importance of newly
presented evidence in showing actual innocence.39 Moreover, the burden

" See Kidd, 651 F.3d at 953 ("Whatever the merits of a modified approach in situations like the
one faced by Kidd, our panel is not at liberty to ignore Amrine because we have already applied
Amrine in situations like Kidd's."); see also Osborne, 411 F.3d at 920 (invokingAmrine in claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present exculpatory evidence); Nance, 392 F.3d
at 291 (applying narrow definition of new evidence where underlying claim was ineffective
assistance of counsel). The modified approach of which the court spoke referred to a Third
Circuit opinion stating, "[o]verall we are inclined to accept the Amrine definition of new evidence
with the narrow limitation that if the evidence was not discovered for use at trial because trial
counsel was ineffective, the evidence may be regarded as new provided that it is the very
evidence that the petitioner claims demonstrates his innocence." Houck, 625 F.3d at 94. The
court concluded that it was bound to follow precedent according to the principle of stare decisis,
which provides that a determination by a court on a point of law will be followed by a court of the
same or lower rank if the subsequent case presents the same legal problem. See Kidd, 651 F.3d at
953; Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910) (explaining doctrine of stare decisis). For
most court systems, stare decisis is not an inexorable command of adherence to the latest
decision, yet for federal appellate courts, the law of circuit rule provides that the decision of one
panel is binding on future panels unless and until the panel's opinion is reversed or overruled,
either by the circuit sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. See Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That
Didn't Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 713, 718-19 (2009) (explaining stare decisis in detail). The
Eighth Circuit, like every other circuit, follows the law of circuit rule. See United States v.
Pollard, 249 F.3d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating circuit follows earlier panel decisions until
overturned by court en banc or by Supreme Court).
36 See Amrine, 238 F.3d at 1029 (requiring newly-discovered evidence in gateway claims).
Commentators have correctly noted that the newly-discovered evidence standard creates an
unnecessary, additional hurdle for petitioners. See Nelson, supra note 30, at 728 (criticizing
newly-discovered evidence approach as inconsistent with purposes of actual innocence standard).
17 See generally Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (explaining importance of
society's
interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources).
38 See Amrine, 238 F.3d at 1029 (elucidating standard without discussing Schlup's use of word
"presented" in analysis). The Seventh Circuit opined that it would not consider the absence of a
newly "discovered" requirement in Schlup as mere oversight in light of the Court's prior holding
in Herrera, which explicitly required newly-discovered evidence. Gomez v. Jaimet, 350 F.3d
673, 679 (7th Cir. 2003).
" See Nelson, supra note 30, at 722-24 (identifying various reasons petitioners would be unable
to procure new evidence post-conviction). Namely, evidence is subject to degradation and
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for proving actual innocence in gateway claims is sufficiently stringent
without requiring a petitioner to present newly-discovered evidence 4
Indeed, two studies examining cases during the ten years subsequent to
Schiup demonstrated that the vast majority of petitioners failed to satisfy
the actual innocence threshold, regardless of which standard was applied,

and more recent cases corroborate that 4the
newly-presented rule under
1

Schiup remains a high threshold to satisfy.
Even if the Eighth Circuit declines to adopt the newly-presented
evidence rule in all circumstances, at a minimum it should apply this
standard in cases where the underlying claim is ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to present exculpatory evidence.42 Even the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which generally adopts the
more restrictive approach, conceded that it would be inclined to apply the
more liberal approach to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to raise evidence, recognizing that it would be unfair to apply the
newly-discovered rule. 43 Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit captured the inequity of applying the more narrow
rule in such instances when it stated, "[i]f procedurally defaulted

destruction, witnesses disappear or die, and memories fade. Id. at 722-23. In addition, Nelson
states that the overwhelming majority of successful gateway petitioners establish innocence
through a combination of newly-presented evidence, newly-discovered evidence, and a reexamination of evidence adduced at trial. Id. at 723; see, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538
(2006) (considering all evidence, old and new, to determine petitioner's actual innocence); Souter
v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 596 (6th Cir. 2005) (considering all evidence to find petitioner innocent);
Garcia v. Portuondo, 334 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (analyzing all evidence in
determining petitioner made credible actual innocence claim).
40 See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324 (observing rarity of constitutional errors leading to conviction of
innocent persons). The Schiup standard is met only upon a showing that no reasonable juror
would convict in light of the new evidence. Id. at 327; see also House, 547 U.S. at 538
(reiterating that Schiup is demanding, permitting review only in extraordinary case); Gomez, 350
F.3d at 680 (commenting on high standard imposed by Schiup).
41 See House Amicus Brief, supra note 30, at *10 (noting only 9.2% of petitioners successfully
raised gateway claims during ten years subsequent to Schiup); Dow et al., supra note 30, at 399400 (demonstrating not one successful gateway claim during three months after House); see also,
e.g., Gomez, 350 F.3d at 680 (holding petitioner failed to present reliable evidence satisfying
actual innocence burden); Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
petitioner's evidence insufficient to support gateway claim); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982,
990 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting petitioner's actual innocence gateway claim); cf Houck v.
Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating even if court considered petitioner's evidence,
it would fail to demonstrate petitioner's innocence).
42 See Nelson, supra note 30, at 723 (positing newly-discovered rule strips miscarriage of justice
exception of its purpose-identifying innocent prisoners).
4"See Houck v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2010) ("As we have indicated, the rule that
Amrine sets forth requires a petitioner, such as Houck, in effect to contend that his trial counsel
was not ineffective because otherwise the newly presented evidence cannot be new, reliable
evidence for Schiup purposes.").
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ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be heard upon a showing of
actual innocence, then it would defy reason to block review of actual
innocence based on what could later amount to the counsel's
constitutionally defective representation., 44 Finally, application of the
broader definition of the rule would not present any great threat to comity
or federalism, as ineffective assistance of counsel claims must overcome a
very onerous barrier.45
The court's decision in Kidd is unfortunate not only because it
perpetuates the wrong standard, but also because the court's hand was
forced by previous Eighth Circuit decisions that applied the Amrine
standard to claims beyond which the Amrine court had the opportunity to
consider.46 A thorough examination of Amrine reveals that the court never
had the opportunity to evaluate the precise issue presented in Kidd, because
the petitioner in the case, Joseph Amrine, did not attempt to resurrect a
procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure
to present exculpatory evidence.47 Amrine did raise such a claim, however,
it was not procedurally defaulted; accordingly the Amrine court resolved
the issue on the grounds that Amrine was not prejudiced by counsel's
flawed performance.48 Conceivably, then, while the initial forcefulness of
Amrine to claims like the one made by Kidd may have been tenable, the
Eighth Circuit's repeated invocation of Amrine in deciding cases similar to
Kidd's effectively foreclosed the Kidd court's ability to review Kidd's
49
claims.
In a society that would rather free the guilty than convict the
innocent, the writ of habeas corpus is an invaluable safeguard protecting
the innocent from erroneous incarceration. Indeed, the Supreme Court had

44 Gomez, 350 F.3d at 680.
45 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing strong presumption that

counsel's conduct is competent).
46 See supra text accompanying note 30 (outlining specific ineffective assistance of counsel
claims raised inAmrine). Compare Kiddv. Nonnan, 651 F.3d 947, 953 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying
newly-discovered evidence rule to claims of ineffective counsel for failure to present evidence),
with Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 1023, 1029 (2001) (establishing newly-discovered evidence
rule where petitioner attempted to resurrect other ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
47 See Amrine, 238 F.3d at 1029 n.3 (enumerating Amrine's procedurally barred claims); see also

supra text accompanying note 30 (indicating slight difference between Amrine and Kidd's
claims).
48 See id. at 1030-31 (holding Amrine's claim failed because he was not prejudiced by counsel's
performance).
49See Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 920 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Amrine's newly-discovered
rule in rejecting petitioner's claim); Nance v. Norris, 392 F.3d 284, 291 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying
Amrine to claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present exculpatory evidence);
see also Sloan, supra note 35, at 718 (explaining binding nature of horizontal stare decisis on
federal appellate courts).
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this tenet in mind when it created the actual innocence exception, allowing
review of procedurally defaulted claims of constitutional error.
Problematically, however, jurisdictions that unequivocally adopt the newlydiscovered evidence rule subvert the actual innocence doctrine's function
of protecting individual rights. Where such grave liberty interests are at
stake, jurisdictions, such as the Eighth Circuit, should seriously reconsider
their position.
David Cashman

